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MAC-V-SOG PERIOD-1
MACVSOG - Command History Annexes A,N & M
(1964-1966):
First Secrets of the Vietnam War
by Charles F. Reske
[Webmaster note: this web page includes four sections which are
excerpts from the first
book in a series of three.]
Sections from the first book:
- Appendix B
- Maritime Operations - Historical Summary
- Maritime Operations
- Appendix III
APPENDIX B
The PTF -- MACV-SOG's
Fast Patrol Boat
by Charles F. Reske
While covert operations throughout Southeast Asia were nothing new, the
personnel of the Maritime Studies Branch and Maritime Studies Group were
clearly the stars of the show from 1964 through 1966. Though this star
would be partially eclipsed by the activities of the Ground and Airborne
Studies Groups, the majority of actions above the 17th parallel were
conducted by the U.S. Navy and the Coastal Security Service.
After November of 1968 all U.S. forces, MACV- SOG included, were
prohibited from operating in North Vietnam -- with the single exception of
the Maritime Studies Group. SOG's private Navy continued to conduct
kidnapping missions, propaganda operations, and the interdiction of NVN's
fishing and shipping industries until the organization was disestablished
in 1972.
Naval operations in Southeast Asia had been underway since the 1950's,
with the U.S. Navy assisting in the mass exodus from North Vietnam at the
time of partition. Clearly, the naval elements were the most experienced
and successful American covert war assets in Vietnam.
The most potent of SOG's Maritime resources were the PTFs, the so
called "Nasty" Class motor gunboats built by Batservice Verft
A/S in Mandal, Norway. Designed by Norwegian Naval Architect Jan H. Linge,
the first PTF's were completed in 1957, and subsequently entered service
with the Royal Norwegian Navy, U.S. Navy, and West German Navy.
The PTF could be configured in one of two ways. The original
configuration was that of a Motor Torpedo Boat, with easy conversion to a
Motor Gun Boat or minelayer with the addition of mine rails.
Capable of doing 44 knots at 75 tons displacement (70 tons plus half
fuel), the boat had a cruising range of approximately 450 miles at maximum
cruising speed, 500 miles at 35 knots, and 600 miles at 20 knots. In a
long range version of the PTF, the approximate cruising ranges expanded to
800 miles (38 knots), 900 miles (35 knots), and 1100 miles (20 knots) .
In all, Batservice Verft A/S built 16 PTF's for MACV-SOG. Unable to
keep up with increased U.S. demands for more of the craft, the contract
was let to Trumpy Boat Works in Annapolis, Maryland.
MARITIME OPERATIONS
HISTORICAL SUMMARY
- Operations Summary
- Crews for Maritime Craft
- PTF Delivery Schedule
- PTF Maintenance
- PTF Support
- -- Deleted -- Defense [Package Two. A plan to
add four to six U.S. aircraft to afford cover and incorporate action
against certain North Vietnamese coastal targets above the 19th
Parallel.]
- PTF-1 and PTF-2 Disposition
- Swift Status
- PTF Lease
Maritime Operations
I. Operations Summary
1. Maritime Operations Section of SOG, functioning as two staff
components of USNAD -- Deleted -- [Da Nang] commenced formal
operations in February 1964 with unsuccessful swimmer attacks against --
Deleted -- and -- Deleted -- at -- Deleted -- [a kidnap mission and
demolition sortie in NVN] on 16 February 1964. They were followed by
a similarly unsuccessful swimmer attack at -- Deleted -- and two aborted
actions against -- Words Deleted -- A total of eight action personnel
were lost on these operations.
2. The first in a planned series of DRV fishing junk captures, named
operation [Possibly: Lucky Dragon, Glynn Reef, Hai Gang Tudo-I]
was successfully executed off (shore) on 27 May. -- Two Sentences
Deleted -- Three successive team actions resulted in destruction of a
storage facility at -- Deleted -- 12 June, demolishing a -- Deleted -
bridge [Bridge Route One?] in the vicinity of -- Deleted -- on 26
June, and damage to the -- Deleted -- pump house on 30 June. On 26 June,
defection offers to DRV -- Deleted -- [Junk or Swatow] captains
were placed in lighted buoys off -- Deleted -- [Possibly: Phuoc Loi]
naval bases in support of psychological operations concept
"Operation Lure."
3. -- Deleted -- were successful on 9 and 25 July respectively. A
team action against the -- Deleted - security post on 15 July was
aborted in the objective area, with loss of two team members. [Late
in 1963 similar operations had been carried out with JCS approval of
CINCPA C OPLAN 34-63, which called for MACV and CAS (the Saigon office
of the Central Intelligence Agencyl, Saigon to pro- vide advice and
assistance to the GVN in certain operations against North Vietnam. Phase
I of the plan was to consist of Psychological Operations, Phase II of
Hit and Run Attacks. The latter included amphibious raids using
Vietnamese UDT/SEAL Team, Rangers, Airborne, and Marine units against
selected targets south of the Tonkin Delta having little or no security.
It almost goes without saying that U.S. advisors accompanied the
Vietnamese on these missions.]
4. At this stage of operations, with Navy adapted 81mm mortars
installed on PTFs 7 and 8 (recently arrived at -- Deleted --) [USNAD
Da Nang] it was decided to initiate the already programmed
bombardment concept in support of OPLAN 34A, commencing with utilization
of 57mm teams from the deck of PTFs and later expanding to the 81mm
mortars. The first bombardments on 30 July, utilized PTFs 2 and 5
against -- Deleted -- Officer in Tactical Command (OTC)- Deleted --, and
PTFs 3 and 6 against -- Deleted -- (OTC) -- Deleted - These missions
were well executed and highly successful, with secondary explosions as
-- Deleted - and enemy resistance encountered at -- Deleted -
5. In July MACV set up July-August -- Deleted - [VNN/CSS]
patrol coordination procedures, indicating -- Deleted -- [VNN/CSS]
Maritime Operations compatibility, provided MACV always had accurate
knowledge of -- Deleted -- [VNN/CSS] whereabouts. On 31 July a
DeSoto -- Deleted - [Desoto: USN Destroyer intelligence gathering
patrols off North Vietnam] entered the - Deleted [Tonkin
Gulf] which made it necessary to schedule maritime operations during
this period no sooner than 36 hours after passage of the -- Deleted - [Destroyer]
in any specific area. [Refers to OPLAN34A attacks against Non Gnu
and Non Me islands.]
6. Dates for proposed bombardments against -- Deleted -- [Possible
targets included Vinh Son, Mui Dao, Yen Phu, or Sam Son radar
installations in NVN] radar and -- Deleted -- security post were
adjusted to conform and the actions were executed on 3 August. PTF-6
reported many fires upon departure from -- Deleted -- bombardment and as
a result of the -- Deleted -- bombardment by PTFs 2 and 5, -- Deleted --
radar was off the air for an approximate period of at least five days.
During this action, -- Deleted -- [DeSoto] patrol was in the
northern reaches of the -- Deleted -- [Gulf] and to insure
noninterference, was requested by COM- USMACV not to proceed below --
Deleted - [possibly 19th parallel] during the night of 3-4 August
.
7. The ensuing attack by DRV motor torpedo boats against -- Deleted
-- [DeSoto] patrol ships on the night of 4 August precipitated a
stand-down of maritime operations in the -- Deleted -- [Gulf] ordered
by JCS, which was eventually to result in no boat activity in -- Deleted
-- [North Vietnam] for a two month period.
[On 2 August 1964 the USS Maddox was attacked in the Tonkin
Gulf by DR V motor torpedo boats while on a DeSoto patrol off the
DR V coast. Several patrol boats were sunk. On 4 August 1964 the
USS Maddox and C. Turner Joy were attacked in a repetition of the 2
August incident. After efforts to confirm the attack, President Johnson
authorized reprisal air strikes against the North. Many historians have
long suspected that MACSOG 34A PTF operations in the Tonkin Gulf led to
the DRV attack on the Maddox. They also suspect that the subsequent
attack on the Maddox and C. Turner Joy on 4 August 1964 never actually
took place. On 7 August 1964 President Johnson briefed leaders of
Congress, and had a resolution of support for U.S. policy introduced. It
was passed with near-unanimity by both Houses. The Tonkin Gulf
Resolution, while not a formal declaration of war, effectively put
America squarely on the path that would lead to 58, 000 American deaths
in Southeast Asia. By 1973, when the last U.S. troops were pulled out of
Vietnam, more than 2.5 million Americans had been in- country.]
To preclude loss of craft from possible reprisal effort by DRV --
Deleted -- [Coastal], Air, and/or Naval elements immediately
following the 4 August -- Deleted -- [Gulf] incident, the eight
PTFs deployed to -- Deleted -- [USNAD, Da Nang] on 5 August with
combined US/VNN crews on board (VNN, OTC -- Name Deleted -- and Senior
US Advisor Lt(jg)- Name Deleted -- Overall staff coordination for the
deployment was supervised by the Chief, Maritime Operations Section of
SOG (Cdr -- Name Deleted --) and on-scene liaison was effected by Lcdr
-- Name Deleted -- and Lt(jg) -- Name Deleted -- All craft returned to
-- Deleted -- [USNAD] by 10 August.
8. In August JCS requested testing of a 106mm RR on board a PTF for
possible use as a standoff weapon with sufficient range to reach some
inland targets not attainable with the 81mm mortar. The ordnance was
obtained from -- Deleted -- along with suitable supervisory personnel
and complete tests were conducted over a period of several weeks.
Resulting shock damage to PTF components, indicated unsatisfactory
capability of employment of the 106mm RR in this manner and this was
reported to JCS.
[In 1971 SOG mounted Communist-made 122mm rockets and launchers
aboard their PTFs. This allowed the boats to fire two salves of four
rockets in a 15 minute period at a standoff range of 11,000 meters.]
9. On 12 August CINCPACFLT requested COMSEVENTHFLT plan for aircraft
cover of maritime operations probe into the -- Deleted -- [DRV]
utilizing Seventh Fleet EC-121 following -- Words Deleted -- Plans were
developed by COMSEVENTHFLT and MACSOG for two such coordinated missions
scheduled for 28 and 31 August. At this time, it was felt appropriate
that a set of communication and recognition signals be developed for use
in case of emergency procedures between units of the Seventh Fleet and
SOG craft. The first set of signals was to be promulgated on 23 August
by MACSOG and incorporated the already existing two letter recognition
signals, developed in July for use between Coastal Security Service (CSS)/VNN
craft in I Corps coastal waters by the Naval Advisory Group. The
proposed missions were eventually passed over by events and did not
materialize. However, the significance of the two emergency procedures
developed at this time was to be confirmed by examples of their future
usefulness.
10. Higher authority decided upon VNAF vice U.S. air cover for
maritime operations -- Deleted -- [in South Vietnam] only.
Accordingly, NAD installed an/ARC-27 in PTFs for A1H compatibility and
conducted training with VNAF A1H controlled by SOG C-123 aircraft.
11. During late August, an accidental rocket launcher explosion
resulting in injury of a SEAL team member at -- Deleted -- prompted
CINCPACFLT to initiate action to assist in testing/development and
procurement of all operational ordnance items.
12. JCS authorized resumption of maritime operations and requested
schedule submission by 12 September. A five day -- Deleted -- was
scheduled for commencement 17 September. MACSOG submitted eight proposed
operations to run over a 13 day period commencing 23 hours after the --
Deleted -- [DeSoto] patrol cleared the -- Deleted -- [Gulf] (22
September).
[Very little was accomplished during September of 1964.]
13. -- Deleted -- [OPLAN 34A] Maritime Operations delayed due
to weather and on 21 September all PTFs deployed to -- Deleted -- to
evade Typhoon Tilda, returning 23 September. -- Deleted -- [OPLAN
34A] was deferred indefinitely. Maritime operations L-day probe off
-- Deleted -- [Vinh Sor] further delayed by Typhoon Anita and
residual was finally conducted 3 October.
[October Schedule]
Recon L-Day (Oct. 4) Probe to 12 miles of Vinh Sor.
Recon L-Day + 2 (Oct. 10) Probe to 3 miles of Vinh Sor.
Loki IV L + 5 -- Junk capture failed.
32 & 45 E L + 8 (Oct.28/29) Bombard Vinh Son radar and Mui Dao
observation post.
November Schedule
34B L + 12 (Nov. 4, on) Bombardment of barracks on Hon Matt and Tiger
Island.
L + 13 Capture of prisoner by team from PTF.
L + 15 Junk Capture.
L + 19 Bombard Cap Mui Ron and Tiger Island.
L + 25 Bombard Yen Phu and Sam Son radar.
L + 28 Blow up Bridge Route 1 and bombard Cap Mui Dao.
L + 30 Return any captives from L + 15.
L + 31 Bombard Hon Ne and Hon Me.
L + 36 Blow up pier at Phuc Loi and bombard Hon Ngu.
L + 38 Cut Hanoi-Vinh rail line.
L + 41 Bombard Dong Hoi and Tiger Island.
L + 24 Bombard Nightingale Island.
14. At CINCPAC suggestion, DD/PTF training plan was formulated and
firmed during OTG 70.8 representatives Cdr -- Name Deleted -- visit to
USNAD, with USNAD providing PTFs for one-time identity training
exercise, which eventually expanded into formal continuing training. CSS
emergency communication and recognition procedures were promulgated in
final format on 4 October.
15. Maritime operations missions for approximately one and one-half
month period were forwarded per JCS request on a time schedule format.
All missions were to be launched only upon JCS case by case evaluation
of previous mission and JCS authorization.
16. OTG 70.8 usurpation of maritime operations PTF services resulted
in MACSOG deferment of services until schedule was submitted via MACV
and cleared. MACSOG proposal for orderly scheduling was concurred in and
reiterated by COMSEVENTHFLT, and PTF services resumed.
17. After several aborted -- Words Obscured - was conducted 10
October, and -- Word Obscured -- was conducted 15 October capture. [10
October: Probe to within 3 miles of Vinh Sor. 15 October: Failed Junk
capture.] -- Words Deleted -- bombardment was delayed due to
erroneous photo interpretation readout indicating motor torpedo boats
plus weather. It was successfully conducted 28 October. [Bombard Vinh
Son radar and Mui Dao observation post.]
18. In order to take advantage of a few days of periodic good weather
during the northeast monsoon, maritime operations commenced submission
of several final OPLANS for successive conduct. Operations were
restricted -- Words Deleted -- by message through special communication
channels due to higher authority concern over DRV reaction capability.
19. In view expanding interest in maritime operations, MACSOG
requested CINCPAC distribute emergency procedures to additional
addressees including PACAF [Pacific Command Air Force].
20. MACSOG conducted a six boat naval bombardment of -- Deleted -- on
26 November, and 27 December and -- Deleted -- radar on 8 December. [See:
October/November Schedule.]
21. The Quang Khe naval bombardment was aborted in the target area
due to DRV naval order of battle on 1 and 22 December and aborted
because of weather. December operations were dominated by unfavorable
(conditions) and typhoon weather.
22. MACSOG requested the presence of U.S. Naval vessels (specially)
modified in anti-DRV measures in the -- Word Obscured -- for
psychological operations (when weather conditions preclude maritime
operations).
23. Approval for -- Deleted and Illegible -- as corollary junk
capture are granted for conduct. [Possibly refers to a series of
MAROPS designated LOKI IV.] Request for case-by-case windfall VNN
attack against anchored/disabled DRV craft and vulnerable windfall beach
targets was approved.
24. JCS proposed two package mission concepts with package one to run
from approximately 15 December through 15 January and package two
thereafter, with provision for US air cover in package two.
MACV proposed use of existing CSS emergency procedures; COMSEVENTHFLT
suggested evaluation of procedures, and CINCPAC/CINCPACAF requested that
MACV/COMSEVENTHFLT test. MACV, meanwhile, laid down provisions for
conduct of training due to intensive use of PTFs in favorable periods of
monsoon weather.
[Package One was programmed for 30 days' duration. Basically, they
were shallow penetration raids on all types of targets which would
provide the greatest psychological benefits. The destructive results and
military utility were to be strictly secondary considerations. In other
words, convincing the DRV of U.S. and SVN resolve, and the ability to
strike anywhere with impunity, was more important than the actual
destruction of the targets.
Package Two added 4 to 6 U.S. aircraft to afford protective cover and
incorporate action against certain North Vietnamese coastal targets
above the 19th parallel. This package was intended to begin
approximately 30 days after initiation of the first, although the
instructions cautioned that the plans should be prepared to provide for
an indefinite period of operations under Package One.]
25. JCS informed of intent to launch concepts valid each day if
weather favorable until continuous good weather prevails.
26. MACSOG granted authority to COMSEVENTHFLT to downgrade emergency
procedure extracts to Secret for training. OTG 70.8 proposal DD/PTF
training air/surface tactics on continuing basis. MACSOG approved the
DD/PTF aircraft tactics training plus emergency procedures against
returning PTFs for missions above 17th parallel.
II. Crews For Maritime Craft
1. On 18 January 1964 General -- Name Deleted - dispatched letter (MACSOG
0061-64) to Major General -- Name Deleted -- RVN, concurring in his
proposal to raise the manning in the VNN from 45 to 145 men during 1964
to support the boat requirements.
2. On 27 January 1964, General -- Name Deleted -- dispatched another
letter to General -- Name Deleted -- (MACSOG 0062-64) informing him that
there would be a total of eight boats and listed personnel requirements
for the six additional boats. Dates for crew availability were listed as
follows:
a. Crew requirements: 1 March: 30
b. Crew requirements: 15 April: 30
c. Crew requirements: 15 May: 30
d. Supervisory personnel as soon as possible: Seven officers.
3. On 12 February 1964, General -- Name Deleted -- dispatched letter
(MACSOG ~059-64) to General -- Name Deleted -- outlining the same
requirements to those forwarded to General -- Name Deleted -- with the
additional requirement for 40 station team personnel.
4. The following personnel reported for duty with Mobile Support Team
(MST) as boat training teams for PTFs 3 and 4: -- Names of Assigned
Personnel Deleted -
5. On 21 April 1964 the following personnel reported to MST-1-64 for
duty with boat training teams 5 and 6: -- Names Deleted -
6. On 2 May PTFs 5 and 6 arrived and the crews (spares from PTFs 3
and 4) commenced training. PTF-5 was operational ready 7 June and PTF-6
was operational ready 24 June.
7. On 19 June 1964, Chief, SOG forwarded a letter to COMUSMACV
requesting two complete crews for PTFs 7 and 8. The letter was prepared
for forwarding official requests to General -- Name Deleted --, although
-- Illegible -- agreed to provide such crews. Colonel -- Name Deleted --
coordination was obtained on the letter. On 22 June, General -- Name
Deleted -- replied that he had discussed the requirement with General --
Name Deleted - that the latter had approved our request.
8. On 27 April the following personnel reported to MST-1-64 for duty
with boat training teams 7 and 8: -- Names Deleted -
9. PTFs 7 and 8 with VNN crews arrived and commenced training 7 July.
Both crews were operational ready by mid-August.
10. On 28 August, General -- Name Deleted - dispatched a letter to --
Illegible -- [possibly SES (Special Exploitation Service)] Subj:
Personnel. Among other requests, this letter requested that VNN provide
PTF crew 9 as a spare crew.
III. PTF Delivery Schedule
1. -- Deleted -- stated that PTF-3 was delivered - DTG Illegible --
MACSOG attempted to confirm delivery of PTF's 5 and 6 on or about 14 May
with COMNAVBASE SUBIC.
[Subic Naval Base in the Philippines. Many of SOG's Maritime
assets plied back and forth between Subic and Da Nang for refitting and
repair. Eventually MA CSOG would contract with ECC to provide on site
repair and service technicians for the VNN.]
2. CINCPACFLT stated PTFs 1 and 2 plus pontoon dock, crane barge, and
tender being readied at -- Deleted -- for delivery to -- Deleted -- The
anticipated delivery of the PTFs was 22-24 April.
[PTFs, also called Nasty Boots, were built by Boatservice Ltd. A/S
of Mandal, Norway. The hulls consisted of two layers of mahogany that
sandwiched a layer of fiberglass. Equipped with British engines (Napier-Deltic
diesels), they had a range of 450 miles at 41 knots, or 600 miles at 25
knots. Those extended cruising ranges made them ideal for long range
covert missions above the 17th parallel. With a crew of3 officers and 16
enlisted, they and their American-built successors served throughout the
war. PTF-I and PTF-2 were later sunk as targets. PTFs 4, 8, 9, 14, 15,
and 16 were sunk in action between 1964 and 1966. Jane's Fighting Ships,
1974-75]
3. In answer to a query by COMNAVFOR, Seventh Fleet, COMNAVBASE SUBIC
informed as to the following proposed PTF shipping dates:
a. 13 April: Pontoon drydock, crane, and tender barge.
b. 20 April: PTFs 1 and 2.
c. 1 May: PTFs 5 and 6; return PTFs 3 and 4 to Subic for fuel tank
improvement.
d. 20 May: Return PTFs 3 and 4 to Da Nang.
e. 20 June: PTFs 7 and 8.
4. On 20 April CTF 76 [Commander, Task Force 76] informed
MACSOG and others of following revised PTF delivery schedule via --
Deleted -
a. 26 April: PTFs 1 and 2 to -- Deleted -
b. 14 May: PTFs 5 and 6 to -- Deleted -
c. 15 May: PTFs 3 and 4 for Subic; return -- Deleted -
d. 23 June: PTFs 7 and 8 to -- Deleted -
5. CINCPACFLT requested evaluation of PTFs 1 and 2 due to greatly
different characteristics and recommendation as to whether these craft
should be removed from Vietnam.
6. MACSOG requested CINCPACFLT to delay delivery of PTFs 7 and 8
until on or about 15 July due to slippage in docking facilities and fuel
farm system. This would also permit noise level tests on these boats and
input of VNN crews which are scheduled arrive -- Deleted -- July.
COMSEVENTHFLT agreed to the above request and stated that -- Deleted -- [Boatservice
A/S Ltd.] could make delivery about 15 August. In reply, MACSOG
stated delivery on 7 July was desired. Accordingly, CINCPACFLT
established 7 July as delivery date.
7. In response to JCS query, COMUSMACV stated five additional PTFs
were needed; two to replace PTFs 1 and 2 with these additional PTF
back-up in Subic.
8. CINCPACFLT stated four new PTFs were due -- Deleted --
January-March 1965.
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